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I. INTRODUCTION 
A patent's claims define the invention.1 The United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) examines the invention to determine its patentability, 
and if the Office issues a patent on the invention, the same claims may be 
scrutinized in a district court to determine whether the patent is enforceable and 
valid.2 The process of interpreting claims, not surprisingly, plays a critical role in 
both examination by the USPTO and litigation in the courts. A claim's meaning 
must be known in order to determine whether the claimed invention is novel and 
non-obvious, or whether someone else is practicing the invention. Accordingly, 
the way in which claims are interpreted-the methodology that is employed-is 
a constant focus of the judiciary, scholars, and attorneys. In fact, some 
commentators identify the difficulty in determining a claim's meaning as one of 
the primary reasons the patent system is broken.3 
Interestingly, although there has been much commentary on claim 
interpretation methodology in general, no one has fully explored the propriety of 
the unique claim interpretation doctrine that the USPTO employs to interpret 
every claim in every patent application.4 The courts instruct the USPTO to give 
every applied-for claim its "broadest reasonable interpretation" (BRI) during 
patent examination.5 Everyone seems to have accepted this dichotomy-that a 
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more 
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter 
which the applicant regards as his invention."); White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 
52 (1886) ("The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very 
purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his invention is .... "). 
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 131, 281-282 (2006). 
See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 8-11 (2008). 
While not directly discussing the validity of the USPTO's use of the broadest 
reasonable interpretation standard in interpreting patent claims, Michael 
Risch has explored whether the USPTO's current claim construction 
methodology helps or hinders the public notice function of patent claims. 
See Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 179, 192-200 (2007) (concluding that the standard employed 
inhibits public notice of claim scope); see also Joel Miller, Claim Construction 
at the PTO - The "Broadest Reasonable Interpretation ... ", 88 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 279 (2006) (describing the broadest reasonable 
interpretation standard). 
In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
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different claim interpretation methodology should be used in examination than 
that which is used in enforcement actions.6 
Nevertheless, interpreting a claim's meaning differently-depending on 
the venue in which the interpretation takes place-requires some justification. 
Given that the BRI standard plays a role in every applied-for patent, the 
propriety of the BRI standard needs to be explored. An examination of the BRI 
standard has become even more important given the standard's foundational 
role in a recent precedential opinion of the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (Board).7 
This article does what is long overdue: it fully explores the validity of the 
BRI standard. The previously articulated rationales behind the BRI standard are 
severely lacking. Not only does the BRI standard fail to provide the advantages 
touted by the courts that created the standard, the standard is contrary to both 
the patent statutes and the concept of a unitary patent system. It allows 
examiners to avoid difficult claim interpretation issues; it leads to improper and 
uncorrectable denials of patent protection; and it is incurably ambiguous. Given 
that the BRI standard is severely lacking, the courts and the USPTO should 
abandon it and utilize a single, consistent claim interpretation methodology 
throughout the patent system. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II describes the BRI standard 
and the traditional justifications for the standard. Part III details objections to the 
standard, and discusses why the commonly offered justifications do not hold up 
under critical analysis. Finally, Part IV uses three recent Federal Circuit cases 
employing the BRI standard as examples of what is wrong with the BRI 
standard. 
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE "BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION" 
STANDARD 
A. Operation of the BRI Standard 
During the examination process at the USPTO, the Office gives pending 
claims their BRI pursuant to "decades old case law."8 The Federal Circuit, its 
See infra Part II and accompanying notes. 
See ex parte Miyazaki, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207, 1211 (B.P.A.1. 2008). 
Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027. The USPTO also 
applies the BRI standard in reexamination proceedings, In re Swanson, 540 
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predecessor court-the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)-and the 
USPTO have all consistently applied the BRI standard to the interpretation of 
patent claims during prosecution.9 The use and unique application of the BRI 
standard by the US PTO is well established, as articulated by the CCP A in the 
1953 case, In re Kebrich: 
Whatever may be the practice of the courts in the interpretation 
of claims in infringement proceedings in order to sustain patents 
once granted, it is very definitely settled by a line of consistent 
decisions rendered during a long period of time that in the initial 
consideration of the question of patentability neither the 
tribunals of the Patent Office nor the courts in reviewing their 
action may properly read unexpressed limitations into claims, 
and it is equally as well settled that, so limited, the tribunals and 
the reviewing courts in the initial consideration of patentability 
will give claims the broadest interpretation which, within 
reason, may be applied.10 
The Federal Circuit has recently approved the use of the BRI standard in 
Phillips v. A WH Corp., an en bane decision addressing claim interpretation. 11 The 
specifics of the standard, as explained by the Federal Circuit in In re Morris, are 
as follows: 
[A]s an initial matter, the [US]PTO applies to the verbiage of the 
proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words 
in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of 
10 
11 
F.3d 1368, 1377-78, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2008), as well 
as in reissue proceedings, In re Reuter, 670 F.2d 1015, 1019, 210 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 249, 253 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1581, 1583, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1436, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Sweet, 393 F.2d 837, 841-42, 157 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 495, 499 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Tibbals, 316 F.2d 955, 958, 137 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 565, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1963); In re Kebrich, 201 F.2d 951, 954, 96 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 411, 414 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (articulating the broadest reasonable 
interpretation standard). 
201 F.2d at 954, 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 414. 
415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 
bane). The Federal Circuit has rejected the argument that decisions such as 
Markman v. Westview Instruments have overruled the standard. Morris, 127 
F.3d at 1053-54, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027-28. 
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ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever 
enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be 
afforded by the written description contained in the applicant's 
specification.12 
The BRI standard is commonly accompanied by the additional qualifier 
"consistent with the specification" or similar verbiage.13 The Federal Circuit 
explains this qualifier as a further explanation of a "reasonable" interpretation -
one that does not "ignore any interpretative guidance afforded by the applicant's 
written description."14 
The BRI standard creates a different and unique interpretation 
methodology for the USPTO compared to the methodology used by district 
courts to interpret issued claims (the post-grant methodology).1s The Federal 
Circuit has held it to be reversible error for the USPTO to apply the post-grant 
methodology.16 The USPTO must use the BRI standard.17 
Additionally, the Federal Circuit applies a different standard of appellate 
review to USPTO interpretations of pending claims than it does to district court 
interpretations of issued claims. Since its decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
~ 
Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit has upheld the de novo standard of review 
for district court interpretations of issued claims.18 In contrast, the Federal 
Circuit reviews claim interpretations by the USPTO under a "reasonableness" 








127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027. 
See id. 
See id. 
Id. at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027-28. 
In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1320, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 
1989). Although the Federal Circuit, in In re Zietz, found that the Board had 
committed a serious error by applying the wrong interpretation standard 
and took the time to reprimand the Board and explain this error, id., the 
court ultimately affirmed the board's decision because the error was deemed 
irrelevant to the outcome due to collateral estoppel. Id. at 324, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1324. 
Id. at 321-22, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1321-22. 
See 138 F.3d 1448, 1454, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 
bane). 
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setting.19 Under this "reasonableness" standard of review, the Federal Circuit 
gives the USPTO's interpretations under the BRI standard deference.zo In 
contrast, it gives district court interpretations of issued claims none.21 
B. Articulated Rationales Behind the BRI Standard 
1. Reduces the Likelihood that an Issued Claim is 
Subsequently Interpreted More Broadly 
The major justification for the BRI standard is that "[g]iving claims their 
broadest reasonable construction 'serves the public interest by reducing the 
possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is 
justified."'22 Using the BRI standard during prosecution allows the patent system 
to "hedge its bets." In other words, the BRI standard allows the USPTO to 
consider the full range of reasonable claim interpretations that a claim could be 
given. Then, once a patent issues, the public may assume that the USPTO' s 
review for patentability encompassed any reasonable interpretation of the 
claim(s) done either by a district court or by another patent observer.23 
The standard allegedly helps the USPTO avoid erroneously blessing a 
claim as patentable when a district court may construe the same claim more 
broadly than the USPTO had considered, with the resulting increase in scope 
capturing prior art or an obvious variation of the prior art.24 Thus, the BRI 







Morris, 127 F.3d at 1055, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028-29. 
See id. 
See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1454, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172. This lack of 
deference for district court interpretations is a point of contention. See, e.g., 
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330-31, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J., dissenting) ("Now more than ever I am 
convinced of the futility, indeed the absurdity, of this court's persistence in 
adhering to the falsehood that claim construction is a matter of law devoid 
of any factual component."). 
In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1827, 1830 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571, 222 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 934, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see also In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 
1404-05, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541, 550 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
See Am. Acad., 367 F.3d at 1364, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830. 
See Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1571-72, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 936. 
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claims are patentable when a district court's interpretation would actually render 
them anticipated or non-obvious.25 
2. Claims can be Amended During Prosecution 
A second argument offered in support of the BRI standard is that, in 
contrast to litigation, claims are open to amendment during prosecution.26 
Therefore, "[a]pplicants' interests are not impaired [by the BRI standard] since 
they are not foreclosed from obtaining appropriate coverage for their invention 
with express claim language."27 Presumably, the applicant can fix the examiner's 
interpretation of the claims by amending or arguing the claim whose meaning is 
in dispute. 
The Federal Circuit has stated that the BRI standard "promotes the 
development of [a] written record before the [US]PTO that provides the requisite 
written notice to the public as to what the applicant claims as the invention."28 
This record helps identify the claimed invention because "during patent 
prosecution when claims can be amended, ambiguities should be recognized, 
scope and breadth of language explored, and clarification imposed."29 Amending 
in response to broad interpretations also allows the applicant to "amend the 
claims to obtain protection commensurate with his actual contribution to the 
25 
26 
A "Type I error" is a false-positive-in this context, a false finding of 
patentability; a "Type II error" is a false-negative-in this context is a false 
finding of unpatentability. See, e.g., Ian Ayers & Katharine K. Baker, A 
Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 599, 639-40 (2005) (discussing 
Type I and Type II errors in the context of criminal law). See infra Part III.D 
for more discussion of Type II errors. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2006) (indicating that an applicant can amend in 
response to an examiner's rejection); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Quiqq, 822 
F.2d 1581, 1583, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("Patent 
application claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation during 
examination proceedings, for the simple reason that before a patent is 
granted the claims are readily amended as part of the examination 
process."); Prater, 415 F.2d at 1404-05, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 550. 
27 Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1571, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 936. 
28 In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
29 See In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1320, 1322 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989). 
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art."30 As such, purported justifications of the BRI standard arise from the 
possibility of amending. Amending the claims not only appears to take the sting 
away from the BRI standard, but also is beneficial due to the resulting certainty 
and narrowness in claim scope, thus bringing claims more in line with what the 
applicant actually invented.31 
3. No Presumption of Validity Exists During Prosecution 
The Federal Circuit and CCP A also attempt to justify the BRI standard 
by pointing to the fact that, during examination, patent applications do not enjoy 
the presumption of validity afforded to issued patents.32 Once the examiner 
rejects the application, "the burden of production falls upon the applicant to 
establish entitlement to a patent."33 Rejections under the BRI standard seemingly 
force the applicant to prove that her invention is worthy of patent protection.34 
Responses to rejections and amendments to clarify claim meaning are part of this 
process.35 Thus, the BRI is further justified because it facilitates this necessary 
exchange and provides the public with notice of the scope of the invention before 
the presumption of validity attaches.36 
Ill. PROBLEMS WITH THE BRI STANDARD 
Although the BRI standard has been applied for quite some time, this 









See Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404 n.30, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541, 550 n.30 
(C.C.P.A. 1969). 
See Zietz, 893 F.2d at 321-22, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322. 
See, e.g., Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027-28. 
Id. at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1028 (BNA). 
See id. 
See Zietz, 893 F.2d at 321-22, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322. 
See Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027-28. 
This standard, however, was questioned by an ABA Section of Intellectual 
Property Law subcommittee, chaired by an author of this article, that 
produced a report recommending that the BRI standard be abandoned. See 
Determining Patentability of a Claim in a Patent Application, 2008 AB.A. SEC. OF 
INTELL. PROP. L. REP. 108-3, available at http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/ 
annual2008/business-session/108-3. pdf. 
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recently reaffirmed the use of the BRI standard in a significant indefiniteness 
holding.3s 
The following section articulates a number of fundamental problems 
resulting from the use of a different standard to interpret claims during 
prosecution from the standard applied to interpret issued claims. The BRI 
standard is inconsistent with the plain language of the patent statutes, is contrary 
to the unitary patent system established by the creation of the Federal Circuit, 
allows examiners to hide from tough claim interpretation questions, results in 
incorrect denials of patent protection, and is hopelessly vague. These 
inconsistencies, contradictions, and denials illustrate that none of the previously 
articulated justifications for the differences in the standards hold true. 
A. The BRI Standard Is Inconsistent with the Patent Statutes 
The identical statutory requirements for patentability and validity,39 
which the USPTO applies during examination,40 are applied by district courts 
during litigation.41 These statutory requirements focus on the patentability (or 
validity, in the case of an issued patent) of an "invention,"42 which is defined by 
the patent's claims.43 The same term, "invention," is also used in 35 U.S.C. § 271 
to define the scope of exclusivity that an issued patent affords the patent 
holder.44 The use of the term "invention" does not change throughout Title 35; 
and nothing in the statute suggests that its definition should vary between 
validity considerations and infringement considerations, or between examination 









See ex parte Miyazaki, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207, 1211 (B.P.A.I. 2008). 
35 u.s.c. §§ 101-103, 112 (2006). 
Id.§ 131. 
Id. §§ 151, 282. In addition to district courts, the definitions are applied by 
the International Trade Commission during 337 enforcement actions. See 19 
U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2006). 
35 u.s.c. §§ 101-103, 112. 
Id. § 112, 'II 2. 
Id.§ 271(a). 
See id.§§ 101-103, 112, 131, 151, 282. 
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patent protection-apply to both determinations of patentability during 
prosecution and to inquiries into validity during litigation.46 
The patent statutes therefore establish a singular concept of "invention," 
which is defined by one or more claims that are reviewed for patentability at the 
USPTO and define a right to exclude that is enforceable in district court.47 The 
case law also describes this singular view of invention.48 Patent examiners must 
examine each patent claim to determine its patentability.49 The Office then issues 
patents on those claims that meet the patentability standards,50 and the patentee 
can enforce the issued claims in district courts.51 
Using the BRI standard only during examination and not during 
enforcement proceedings violates this statutorily coded concept of a singular 
invention. Under the current mode of interpretation, the USPTO examines the 
patentability of one invention, construing the claims under the unique BRI 
methodology.52 Once the USPTO issues the patent, the district court may be 
called upon to review the validity of, and give exclusivity for, a different 
invention-the scope of the invention now defined by claims interpreted through 
the post-grant methodology-a methodology that is not glossed by the BRI 
requirement.53 The applicability of differing interpretation standards necessarily 










See id. §§ 131, 281. 
See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 34, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 
473 (1966) ("[T]he patentee obtained his patent only by accepting the 
limitations imposed by the Examiner. The claims were carefully drafted to 
accept these limitations and [the patent holder] is not now free to assert a 
broader view of [the] invention. The subject matter as a whole reduces, 
then, to the distinguishing features clearly incorporated into the claims."). 
See 35 U.S.C. § 131. 
Id.§ 151. 
Id.§ 271 (defining what actions a patentee can take in court when a patent is 
infringed); see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 34, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 473 (stating 
that courts scrutinize the same invention whose claims and scope were 
defined during examination). 
In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) 
See id. 
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determined during enforcement, which would establish different "inventions" for 
the same claim. 
The possibility of such a result violates the unitary nature of "invention" 
set forth in the patent statutes. The USPTO must judge the patentability of the 
very same invention whose validity a district court will enforce.54 The BRI 
standard flies in the face of this required outcome; in fact, it instructs examiners 
to examine a potentially broader invention than that which a district court will 
enforce. 
Concededly, not all patent laws are applied in the same way during 
examination as they are during enforcement actions. Notably, the strong 
presumption of validity, which is applicable to an issued patent during 
litigation,55 does not apply to a patent application during examination.56 In 
addition, the examiner does not have to establish unpatentability of a pending 
patent claim by clear and convincing evidence, which is the threshold an alleged 
infringer must meet to establish the invalidity of an asserted patent claim in 
defense of an infringement action.57 
The act of examination and issuance is what creates the presumption of 





ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 200 
(2004) ("When considering patentability and infringement issues, courts and 
[US]PTO examiners turn to the particular wording of the invention as 
claimed."). 
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) ("A patent shall be presumed valid."). 
In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en 
bane) (finding that the presumption of validity does not apply to 
proceedings before the USPTO and noting, in addition, that patents in 
reexamination do not enjoy the same presumption of validity). 
See id.; SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng'g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 1357, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("Under the patent statutes, a patent enjoys 
a presumption of validity, see 35 U.S.C. § 282, which can be overcome only 
through facts supported by clear and convincing evidence."). The 
presumption is not without its critics, however. See Doug Lichtman & Mark 
A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
45, 46-47 (2007). 
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by any presumption.ss The purpose of examination is to take the first pass on the 
issue of validity- i.e., to determine the patentability of the pending claim(s).59 
The fact that the examiner makes the initial determination on validity, 
whereas a district court looks at an already-examined claim, may justify some 
amount of deference by the district court to the USPTO' s findings. 60 This 
reasoning, however, does not extend far enough to justify interpreting inventions 
differently based on the forum (being either the USPTO or a district court) where 
the interpretation takes place. The same invention that is the subject of 
examination forms the basis for enforcement proceedings in district court.61 It 
does not make sense to vary a claim's meaning-and in tum, the definition of the 
invention-due to the fact that, during examination, patentability has yet to be 
determined. 
In fact, the concept of a presumption of validity necessitates a singular 
understanding of an invention. If, because different standards of interpretation 
are applied, a different invention is deemed to exist during enforcement than 
exists during prosecution, the rationale behind the presumption of validity does 
not hold true.62 The district courts cannot presume that the USPTO has already 
deemed the claimed invention valid because the USPTO looks at an invention 
defined by the BRI standard, which, in theory, is a broader invention-and 
therefore a different invention-than that which the district courts use. It may 
make some sense for subsequent venues to defer to previous adjudicative bodies 
on the issue of validity, but claim meaning and, in tum, the definition of an 







See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 57, at 52 ("First, the presumption of 
validity forces courts to defer to the expertise of the [US]PTO, thereby 
avoiding redundant and possibly inferior second looks by the courts. 
Presumptions are used throughout the law for precisely this reason."). 
See id. at 46. 
Id. at 51-54. However, the current low quality of examination, amongst 
other factors, brings this strong presumption into question. Id. 
35 u.s.c. §§ 131, 281 (2006). 
Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 57, at 53-56. 
The doctrine of equivalents does allow the claim scope to vary post-
issuance. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40-
41, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1876 (1997). However, the Supreme Court 
suggests that examiners consider even the equivalents of claims under 
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B. The BRI Standard Is Contrary to the Unitary Appellate 
Structure of the Patent System 
Congress created the Federal Circuit, in part, to establish uniformity in 
the substantive patent law applied in USPTO proceedings and district court 
patent litigation proceedings.64 Prior to the court's institution, different 
standards could apply in different venues because different appellate courts 
independently reviewed decisions from these venues.6s This lack of uniformity 
resulted in varying interpretations of the patent laws. 66 The creation of a single 
appellate court and, in turn, a singular body of appellate law, over both the 
USPTO and all district courts, created horizontal equity, which ensures, for 
example, that the same obviousness standard applied during examination also 
applies during enforcement actions.67 Without such horizontal equity, there 






examination. Id. at 32, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 ("And if the [US]PTO 
has been requesting changes in claim language without the intent to limit 
equivalents or, indeed, with the expectation that language it required would 
in many cases allow for a range of equivalents, we should be extremely 
reluctant to upset the basic assumptions of the [US]PTO without substantial 
reason for doing so."). 
See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, 
Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 
369-71, 373-74 (1976). But see Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking 
Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619, 1675 (2007) 
(questioning whether the Federal Circuit has been a successful experiment). 
The CCP A had exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of rejected applications 
from the USPTO while the appropriate regional circuit courts reviewed 
patent infringement decisions. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal 
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1989). 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467 (1966) 
(noting the varying nonobviousness standard and stating that the Court had 
"observed a notorious difference between the standards [of patentability] 
applied by the Patent Office and by the courts"). 
See Dreyfuss, supra note 65, at 8. 
See Christopher A. Cotropia, "Arising Under" Jurisdiction and Uniformity in 
Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 305 (2003) ("With the 
creation of the Federal Circuit, the same appellate law governed the USPTO 
and federal district court patent cases. The same rule of law applied to a 
patent before the USPTO and a patent in federal court, creating a degree of 
horizontal equity."). 
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one set of standards, may think that an application is directed to patentable 
subject matter; whereas, a district court, with a different set of standards, could 
disagree. The court's disagreement would not be with the USPTO's application 
of the law, but rather with the actual interpretation of the law on a given patent 
issue.69 The Federal Circuit removes this inequity and instills a level of certainty 
to patent rights.7o 
The BRI standard disrupts the horizontal equity that the creation of the 
Federal Circuit aimed to establish. By introducing an interpretation 
methodology unique to the USPTO, the Federal Circuit applies a different claim 
interpretation doctrine in USPTO appeals than in district court appeals.71 The 
substantive law of claim interpretation varies depending on the venue.72 This 
variation in interpretation methodology makes it possible for claims to have 
variable meanings depending on the venue of the court interpreting the claims. 
Accordingly, between the USPTO and the district courts, a patentee's 
rights may vary as the claim meaning varies. Such an occurrence is particularly 
likely with the BRI standard given that claim meaning is the fundamental, first 






For example, prior to the Federal Circuit's creation, regional circuits 
disagreed with each other about the patentability of business methods. See 
id. at 301-02 ("Some regional circuits also held that business methods were 
not patentable statutory subject matter, coming to an opposite conclusion to 
that of the Federal Circuit.") (footnote omitted). 
Dreyfuss, supra note 65, at 8; Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit "Choice of 
Law": Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1196 (1996). 
See supra Part III.A 
This situation recreates the problem the Federal Circuit was designed to 
solve: different treatment in different forums due to different interpretations 
of the law. See Schaffner, supra note 70, at 1196. 
See TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 
1139, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Our validity analysis 
is a two-step procedure: 'The first step involves the proper interpretation of 
the claims. The second step involves determining whether the limitations of 
the claims as properly interpreted are met by the prior art."' (quoting 
Beachcombers, Int'!, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 
1160, 31U.S.P.Q.2d1653, 1660 (Fed. Cir. 1994))); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 
bane) ("An infringement analysis involves two steps. First, the court 
determines the scope and meaning of the patent claims asserted, and then 
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difference in treatment injects uncertainty into the beginning of the patent 
process because the meanings of patent claims vary due to venue and, in turn, 
the questions of validity and infringement, which build off claim meaning, vary 
as well. The same patent is not treated the same in different venues; the BRI 
standard explicitly makes this the case and it, as a result, violates the concept of 
horizontal equity.74 
Again, evidentiary standards applied in the two venues differ when 
determining questions of validity.75 As explained in Part Ill.A., however, the 
difference in standards-specifically the existence of a presumption of validity in 
district court-makes structural sense, while the BRI standard does not.76 
C. The BRI Standard Allows Examiners and the Federal Circuit to 
Skirt Tough Claim Interpretation Issues 
The BRI standard also allows examiners to avoid tough claim 
interpretation issues. It explicitly does not require the examiner to determine the 
correct claim interpretation.77 Instead, examiners just need to give the claim a 
"reasonable" interpretation. This means that examiners never need to resolve on 
paper the difficult "read the claims in light of the specification, but do not read 
the limitations from the specification into the claims" conundrum faced in almost 
every claim interpretation inquiry.78 Most importantly, the applicant does not 
have to respond to such analysis. Prosecution history as to whether limitation 
"A" from the specification should be read into the claims is never created because 
the BRI standard prevents the conversation from ever happening. The public is 
then robbed of discussions of claim meaning that could assist in future 
interpretation. These discussions are tailored to the actual methodology courts 






the properly construed claims are compared to the allegedly infringing 
device." (citations omitted)). 
See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text. 
See supra Part III.A. 
Id. 
In other words, the BRI explicitly forecloses any need to find a "correct 
interpretation." 
See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and 
Their Claim Scope Paradigm, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 81 (2005). 
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The case law actually celebrates this fact by arguing that the USPTO 
should err on examining a broader claim because a district court may later give 
the claim a similar broad construction.79 Put another way, the unique standard in 
the prosecution context tilts examination toward a broader claim just in case 
district courts will apply such a broad construction. 
This argument makes some dangerous assumptions. It assumes that 
examiners and district courts are unlikely to arrive at the same interpretation 
under the current claim interpretation rubric. If this assumption is true, then 
there is no reason to believe an examiner would arrive at a correct, broadest 
interpretation under the BRI standard. Examiners are just as likely to misapply 
the BRI standard as they are to misapply the interpretation standard used in the 
litigation process. If anything, the addition of another layer to claim 
interpretation procedure injects more uncertainty and unpredictability into the 
process, making it even more likely that the USPTO will interpret claims 
differently than district courts. 
Adding another interpretation step-determining the BRI after 
discerning the standard claim meaning-just creates another opportunity for like 
minds to differ. If a difference in the resulting interpretation by the USPTO and 
the district courts is so likely that an express doctrine is needed to compensate 
for it, then a deeper-rooted problem exists. The real problem is the lack of 
certainty and predictability in claim construction.80 The real change should 
therefore be to the underlying claim interpretation methodology, not the 
addition of a BRI gloss at the USPT0.81 The BRI standard, at best, only hides a 
more fundamental problem of claim construction. The better solution is to attack 
that problem head-on instead of creating a doctrine to compensate for the base 
doctrine's shortcomings. 
One could argue, as the Board did recently in Ex parte Miyazaki, that the 





See, e.g., In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541, 550 
(C.C.P.A. 1969). 
See, e.g., Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim 
Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1143 (2001). 
For example, decreasing information costs may help the interpretation 
process. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and 
Information Costs, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 90 (2005). 
See 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207, 1211 (B.P.A.I. 2008). 
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laid out a new lower standard for indefiniteness, partially grounded in the BRI 
standard.83 The BRI standard assumes that a claim can be "amenable to two or 
more plausible claim constructions," and so "the USPTO is justified in requiring 
the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed 
invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second 
paragraph, as indefinite."84 
The Board's reasoning misses the point. The Board is correct that the BRI 
standard is premised, at least in part, on the assumption that claim interpretation 
is difficult and that like minds can reach different conclusions. This assumption 
is, however, faulty if it supports different claim-interpretation processes at the 
USPTO and in district courts. Again, if claim interpretation as currently 
articulated is difficult and embroiled in uncertainty, Congress should fix it all the 
way around.85 Notably, this point is not an indictment of the Miyazaki holding, 
which is better grounded, as the Board recognized, in the lack of a presumption 
of validity than in the BRI standard.BG 
D. The BRI Standard Results in Improper Denial of Patent 
Protection 
The BRI standard also creates the possibility that the USPTO will 
improperly reject a patent claim. Under the standard, the USPTO does not 
review an application pursuant to the normal meaning of the pending claims in 
that the USPTO does not use the traditional claim interpretation methodology 








It is possible that the fix will involve using the BRI standard in both the 
USPTO and in district courts rather than abandoning the BRI standard 
altogether. 
See Miyazaki, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212 ("'If this case were before an 
examiner, the examiner might well be justified in demanding that the 
applicant more clearly define [specific claim language], and thereby remove 
any degree of ambiguity. However, we are faced with an issued patent that 
enjoys a presumption of validity."' (quoting Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v. 
United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1384, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1272, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2001))). 
See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1027 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997); In re Kebrich, 201 F.2d 951, 954, 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 411, 414 
(C.C.P.A. 1953). 
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claims their "broadest" interpretation. 88 Claim scope, as interpreted by the 
USPTO, therefore has the possibility of encompassing more subject matter than 
the claim captures when interpreted and enforced in district court.89 This 





Claim Scope Under 
District Coun 
Methodology 
Claim Scope under Different Interpretation Methodologies 
Figure 1 contrasts the resulting scope under the two methodologies. The 
requirement that the USPTO give the claim language its "broadest" reasonable 
interpretation necessarily contemplates a larger resulting claim scope than a 
district court would determine under the normal interpretation methodology 
without the "broadest" lens. 
The complete scope of a pending claim must be patentable to be worthy 
of patent protection.9o The broader the claim, the more likely the USPTO will 
hold it to be unpatentable. Under broader constructions, more subject matter 
falls under the breadth of the claim that could be anticipated, obvious, or 
88 See Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
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unsupported by the application's specification.91 If a claim captures subject 
matter that is any of these, the claim is invalid.92 Referring to Figure 1, the 
diagram depicts the extra scope in gray, and if any prior art either anticipates or 
renders obvious this additional gray material, the claim is invalid.93 Essentially, 
the correlation is that the broader the interpreted scope is, the higher the 
likelihood of rejection. 
Not only does the BRI standard make rejections more likely, it also 
means that some rejections are, in fact, incorrect. They are incorrect because the 
prior art or an obvious variation of the prior art only falls within the claim scope 
that exists under the USPTO's interpretation of the claim-the gray area in 
Figure 1. Under the normal claim interpretation methodology applied by district 
courts, the claim is valid because it does not capture this unpatentable subject 
matter.94 However, upon initial examination of the application, the USPTO takes 
a broader view of the claim's meaning, as required by the BRI standard, and 
finds that the claim is invalid. The BRI standard can thus cause the USPTO to 
reject an application as unpatentable when, in fact, the application contained a 
patentable invention that the Office should have issued. 
The BRI standard has the real possibility of creating Type II errors, false 
negatives, by falsely triggering rejections when no real patentability issue exists.95 
One rationale for using the BRI, and thereby allowing more Type II errors, may 
be the prevention of Type I errors, or false positives, i.e., invalid patents that may 
issue when the USPTO gives pending claims too narrow of an interpretation.96 
The problem with angling the system to avoid Type I errors at the expense of 
Type II errors is that mechanisms are already in place to solve Type I errors, but 
no such mechanisms exist for Type II errors. The USPTO, and the courts, can 







See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 66 
HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 7, on file with authors). 
Id. 
See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 54, at 201. 
See Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027. 
The court seems much more concerned with "reducing the possibility that 
claims, finally allowed, will be given [a] broader scope than is justified," see 
In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571, 222 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 934, 936 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984), than with inappropriate rejections of inventions that are actually 
patentable when construed under the normal standard. 
See id.; supra Part II.B.l. 
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through reexamination, reissue, or invalidation.97 Type II errors, in contrast, 
cannot be resolved under the current system. Once the USPTO deems a patent 
application as unpatentable, there is no recourse. Certainly, an applicant can 
argue the rejection, appeal the rejection to the Board, or appeal the final USPTO 
ruling to the Federal Circuit and eventually to the Supreme Court.98 The BRI 
standard will apply, however, throughout the entire appellate review process.99 
Under the current law, all avenues would continue to apply the BRI standard, so 
if the USPTO incorrectly deems the claim invalid due to a broad claim scope, that 
incorrect interpretation never changes throughout the review process. JOO Thus, 
Type II errors that directly result from the BRI standard are irreversible, and 
even invited, under the current system, whereas the system has extensive 
mechanisms for correcting Type I errors.JOI This disparity makes tilting the 
interpretation methodology at the USPTO (by mandating the use of the BRI 
standard) toward the creation of Type II errors to prevent Type I errors even 
more irrational. 
To compound the problem, recent changes in patentability case law 
make Type II errors more likely. For example, the Supreme Court's decision in 
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. gives examiners additional avenues for 
establishing a pending patent claim as obvious.102 Examiners can now establish 
obviousness even if there was no teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine 




35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006) (allowing for the reissue of defectively issued patents); 
id. § 282 (providing district courts with the ability to invalidate claims); id. § 
301 (setting forth the basis for ex parte reexamination proceedings); id. § 311 
(describing inter partes reexamination). 
Id. § 134 (providing appeal to the Board); id. § 141 (providing appeal to the 
Federal Circuit). 
See, e.g., Morris, 127 F.3d at 1053-54, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027 (applying 
the BRI standard in an appeal to the Federal Circuit from the Board, who 
had affirmed an examiner's rejection under the BRI). Also, pursuant to 35 
U.S.C. § 145 (2006), the applicant could appeal to the district court from the 
Board and the BRI standard would continue to apply. 
100 This fact is demonstrated by the examples set forth below. See infra Part IV. 
101 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1500 (2001) (pointing out that litigation may be a better way to weed 
out bad patents). 
102 550 U.S. 398, 419, 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1397 (2007). 
103 Id. at 419, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396-97. 
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"ordinary creativity of the PHOSITA," or market demand.104 Combining the 
relaxed standard for non-obviousness with an overly broad claim scope makes it 
much more likely that claims will be rejected as obvious under § 103.105 This 
Type II error, stemming from the BRI standard, cannot be corrected- it follows 
the patent application throughout the examination process. 
Accordingly, the BRI standard creates an odd situation: a patent 
applicant must fight to have subject matter allowed that she will not be able to 
enforce in court. Referencing Figure 1, an inventor must prove that the gray area 
is patentable to get into the larger white circle, but will never be able to exclude 
others from practicing the gray area.106 
E. The BRI Standard Forces Costly Amending of Patent Claims 
Additional policy positions in support of the BRI standard suggest that 
the standard does no real harm to the applicant because she can simply amend 
the claims in response to the interpretation and, in tum, achieve the 
interpretation she desires.107 Amending claims, however, carries a recognizable 
cost that has a real impact on the inventor's rights and pocketbook, as well as on 
society in generai.10s 
104 Id. at 419, 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397. "PHOSITA" stands for person 
having ordinary skill in the art. 
105 See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the 
Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 991 (2008) ("The 
greater focus on the characteristics of individual cases suggests a need for 
evidence and factual determinations, but the legal and structural framework 
under which obviousness is tested means that it is difficult to make and 
review those determinations. The realistic approach is also incomplete, 
because the obviousness inquiry depends critically on the counterfactual 
assumption that the PHOSITA, while ordinarily skilled, is perfectly 
informed about the prior art."). 
106 Perhaps the inventor will be able to exclude others from practicing the 
subject matter contained within that gray area via the doctrine of 
equivalents (DOE). There is no linkage, however, between the subject 
matter captured by the DOE and that examined because of the BRI. 
107 See supra Part 11.B.2. 
108 Professor Risch even argues that the BRI standard can lead to "a greater 
number of unclear amendments." See, Risch, supra note 4, at 195. 
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First, amendment, by definition, constricts the patentee's rights. Most 
amendments restrict the scope of equivalents afforded to a patent claim.109 The 
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, in most cases, causes amended claims to 
lose the possibility of obtaining any equivalents.110 If the BRI standard is meant 
to prompt amendment, then the standard forces applicants to forgo some 
equivalence protection. 
Second, amendments go hand-in-hand with additional USPTO and 
attorney costs. Given the complexities of claim drafting, preparing amendments 
requires potentially significant amounts of costly attorney time.111 Amendments 
also prompt additional negotiations with the USPTO and may be filed with a 
request for continued examination, which entails still more attorney time and 
additional filing fees. 112 Likewise, amendments can force a given round of 
prosecution to end immediately, allowing the examiner to issue a final office 
action.m 
This result has special significance because of the pending continuation 
rules, which limit the ability to continue prosecution after final action.114 If the 
109 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736, 
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1711-12 (2002) ("We agree with the Court of 
Appeals that a narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement of 
the Patent Act may give rise to an estoppel."). 
110 See id. at 737, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
111 See, e.g., AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2007 I-79 to I-80 (finding 
the average cost of a single argument or amendment to a patent application 
to be between $1,920 and $3,680, depending on the type and complexity of 
patent application). This cost is beyond the initial amount that is spent to 
prepare and file the original application, averaging $7,012-12,393 or more. 
Id. at I-78. 
112 See 35 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2006); 37 C.F.R. § l.17(e) (2008) (detailing the cost of 
filing a request for continued examination (RCE), currently at $810 for 
someone other than a small entity); 37 C.F.R. § 1.114 (2008) (providing 
specifics for the RCE filing process). 
113 See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a); 37 C.F.R. § 1.113 (2008) (indicating when an examiner 
can issue a final rejection). 
114 See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent 
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of 
Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716-46,843 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to 
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) [hereinafter Changes]. The validity of the rules 
is still in flux, with some aspects of the rules invalidated because they 
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rules come into force, the amendments eat into a patentee's opportunity to file 
continuations.115 Once the available continuations run out, the applicant no 
longer has an available measure to remedy the broadest interpretation, leaving 
the applicant with a claim meaning that does not reflect the same meaning a 
district court would have given the claim.116 
Third, the requirement to amend also necessarily prolongs prosecution, 
generating more of a delay. This delay adds to the backlog at the USPTO, which 
has its own negative impact on patent quality.m The delay also harms 
competitors who then have to wait longer for the patent's final issuance and the 
accompanying information as to what scope of exclusivity they must avoid.118 
Fourth, the argument that an applicant must amend to clarify claim 
meaning ignores the import of statements made during prosecution regarding 
claim interpretation.119 There is no need to force the applicant to amend the 
patent claims. Statements as to claim term meaning may have equal force as 
amendments without causing some of the same negative consequences.120 An 
conflict with 35 U.S.C. § 120. See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1364-65, 90 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1142-43 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (remanding the rule 
challenge to the district court), vacated 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(granting a rehearing en bane). 
115 See Changes, supra note 114. 
116 See supra Part III.D. 
117 See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 57, at 46 (identifying the USPTO's 
resource problem affecting their effective reviewability of the growing 
number of applications). 
118 Patents perform a disclosure function, allowing competitors to design 
around claimed subject matter. See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim 
Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 40 (2000) ("As the term 'design-
around' suggests, a competitor of the patentee may purposefully circumvent 
the boundaries of the patent claim and create a competitive, non-infringing 
alternative to the claimed invention."). 
119 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("In addition to consulting the specification, we have 
held that a court 'should also consider the patent's prosecution history, if it is 
in evidence."' (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 
980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1995))). 
120 Id. Prosecution history statements can also limit equivalence. See Conoco, 
Inc. v. Energy & Envtl. Int'l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1363, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1801, 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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examiner can resolve any ambiguity simply by asking the applicant to clarify and 
then putting the response on the record. 121 This course is preferable to broadly 
interpreting the claim and then forcing the applicant to respond with a costly 
amendment. Moreover, as previously argued, the BRI standard can actually 
have the opposite effect with regard to creating a prosecution history as to claim 
meaning.122 The BRI standard allows examiners to avoid discussions of claim 
meaning-particularly, discussions in the same terms as will take place in district 
court.123 
F. The BRI Standard ls Fatally Ambiguous 
Finally, the case law provides little to no guidance on the contours of the 
BRI standard. It is difficult to find examples or additional verbiage in Federal 
Circuit case law that demonstrate how examiners are to implement the BRI 
standard. The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure's (MPEP) description of 
claim interpretation during prosecution contains no further instructions specific 
to employing the BRI.124 The interpretation section, MPEP section 2111, begins 
by instructing examiners to give pending claims their "broadest reasonable 
interpretation."125 The section goes on to provide no examples, no tests, and no 
direction to examiners on how to implement or employ this standard. 126 The rest 
of section 2111 then recites the same methodology used in district courts to 
interpret claims.127 
The case law regarding claim interpretation actually cited in the MPEP 
exemplifies general claim interpretation principles that apply during both 
prosecution and enforcement proceedings, but it does not elaborate on the 
121 Conoco, 460 F.3d at 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812. To invoke argument-
based estoppel, however, "the prosecution history must evince a 'clear and 
unmistakable surrender of subject matter."' Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow 
Commc'n Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1316, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1489 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 
170 F.3d 1373, 1377, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
122 See supra Part III.C. 
123 Id. 
124 See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE§ 2111 (2007). 
125 Id. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
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specifics of the BRI standard unique to the USPT0.12s Other than the mantra 
"broadest reasonable interpretation," there is simply no articulation of how to 
accomplish this step other than that it should be consistent with the teachings in 
the specification.129 Should the examiner first determine the correct 
interpretation of the claims and then slightly broaden this interpretation? How 
exactly is this accomplished and to what end? 
Finally, the BRI standard has a troubling circularity. When does the 
examiner stop giving claims the BRI gloss? The case law seems to assume that 
once the claims are amended, everything becomes static. Under the letter of the 
law, however, it seems that even amended language needs to be given a BRI, 
which broadens the amended claims beyond their actual meaning.130 
Presumably, the applicant responds by amending again and the process never 
stops. Admittedly, in practice, the process of broad interpretation probably stops 
after an iteration or two. No authority officially indicates, however, when it 
should end; the door is open for multiple applications of the BRI standard to the 
same claim language, regardless of whether the applicant amends it. 
IV. RECENT CASES EXEMPLIFYING THE PROBLEMS WITH THE BRI STANDARD 
A. In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp. - Lack of a Singular 
Definition of Invention and the Introduction of Horizontal 
Inequity 
The Federal Circuit's recent decision in In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp. 
exemplifies how application of the BRI standard results in different definitions of 
the same claim term by the USPTO and a district court.131 In Trans Texas, the 
district court gave the claims at issue a particular meaning, but the USPTO, 
during a reexamination that occurred after the district court's claim construction, 
gave the claims a different meaning based on the BRI standard, which the 
Federal Circuit then affirmed.132 
128 See id. 
129 See id. 
130 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
131 See 498 F.3d 1290, 1292, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835, 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
132 See id. 
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The patent at issue in Trans Texas addressed a system of inflation-
adjusted deposit and loan accounts. 133 In a pending patent litigation, the district 
court construed certain claims and, in due course, the parties to that litigation 
reached a settlement before trial.134 The district court dismissed the case with 
prejudice.135 After the district court had issued the claim construction order, the 
patent holder filed a request for reexamination of the patents at issue.136 The 
USPTO granted the request and reexamination commenced.137 During the 
reexamination, the applicant argued that the district court's claim interpretation 
bound the USPT0. 138 The USPTO, however, denied this request and, under its 
interpretation using the BRI standard, found certain claims invalid as obvious.139 
The applicant appealed the resulting rejection in the reexamination, 
arguing again that the USPTO must follow the district court's earlier claim 
interpretation.140 The Federal Circuit did not agree, noting that the USPTO was 
not a party to the earlier action, so there was no issue preclusion as to the 
question of claim interpretation before the USPTO in the reexamination.141 
The Federal Circuit then reviewed the USPTO's claim interpretation, 
focusing on whether the "[c]laims [were] given 'their broadest reasonable 
interpretation, consistent with the specification, in reexamination 
proceedings."'142 Under this standard, the Federal Circuit agreed with the 
USPTO's interpretation even though it was broader than the district court's 
earlier interpretation of the same claims.143 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1294-95, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838. 
135 Id. at 1295, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838. 
136 Id. at 1294, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 1295, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838. 
140 Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839. 
141 Id. at 1297, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840. 
142 Id. at 1298, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841 (quoting In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 
1569, 1571, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 934, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
143 See id. at 1299, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841 (holding that the USPTO did not 
err by interpreting "responsive to the rate of inflation" as not limited to a 
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This differential created by the BRI-the district court giving the claims a 
different meaning than the USPTO-creates, in essence, two different inventions. 
Yet the application contains only one set of claims and, in turn, only singular 
inventions are at issue. The scope and definition of these inventions should not 
change between the venues. Application of the BRI standard allows for this 
inconsistency and even demands it in some cases, as demonstrated in Trans 
Texas. As noted earlier, such a result contradicts the patent statutes.144 
The result in Trans Texas also demonstrates the horizontal inequity 
introduced by the BRI standard.145 The same claims have different meanings 
depending on the venue of the court interpreting them.146 This inequity occurs 
even post-issuance, when claims are reexamined after district court litigation. 
This practice introduces uncertainty as to a claim's validity and, ultimately, 
enforceability, depending on which venue performs the claim interpretation. A 
patent claim may be valid in district court under normal interpretation 
methodology, but invalid upon a USPTO reexamination because of the BRI.147 
B. In re Graves - Improper Denial of Patent Protection 
The Federal Circuit's decision in In re Graves provides a clear example of 
how the use of the BRI standard can cause the USPTO to deny improperly patent 
protection.148 The court affirmed an anticipation rejection of claims that were 
one-to-one relationship); id. at 1294, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838 (noting the 
district court's interpretation of "responsive to the rate of inflation" as 
clearly imparting a one-to-one correlation). 
144 See supra Part III.A. 
14s See supra Part III.B. 
146 See id. 
147 This lack of horizontal equity presents a very interesting, and plausible, 
scenario. A patentee may successfully enforce a patent claim in district 
court, but the alleged infringer could pursue a reexamination and 
subsequently invalidate the patent claim when interpreted under the BRI-
an analysis that the district court would never have performed under 
normal claim interpretation rules. 
148 See 69 F.3d 1147, 1152, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1697, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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given their BRI.149 The dissent in Graves pointed out that, under a narrower 
interpretation, the claims would have been allowable.150 
The invention at issue in Graves was a device and method for testing an 
electrical system for wire shorts.151 Three independent claims remained in the 
pending application when it was appealed to the Board, who then affirmed the 
rejection under§ 102(b).152 On appeal to the Federal Circuit, these rejections were 
at issue and their validity hinged on the interpretation of the following claim 
element: 
(b) simultaneously monitoring the selected multiple connection 
points or wires for presence of the test signal which is applied 
sequencially [sic] to each point on the interconnect of the system 
under test[. ]153 
The examiner and the Board employed the BRI standard and found the 
limitation to mean that "the simultaneous monitoring of input and output points, 
but not necessarily the simultaneous monitoring of an input point and multiple 
output points."154 A majority at the Federal Circuit agreed.155 The court, staying 
true to the application of the BRI standard, found that this interpretation gave 
the claim element "as broad a reading as possible not inconsistent with the 
applicant's disclosure."156 
The dissent, authored by Judge Nies, offered a different, narrower 
construction of the limitation. The dissent found that "element (b) requires the 
simultaneous monitoring of each of multiple connection points or wires (i.e., 
each of multiple output points)."157 Judge Nies came to this construction because, 
otherwise, "the word 'simultaneously' is rendered superfluous."158 She then 
149 Id. at 1148-49, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698. 
150 See id. at 1154, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1702 (Nies, J., dissenting). 
151 Id. at 1149, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 1151, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700. 




158 Id. at 1153, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1702 (Nies, J., dissenting). 
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noted that "[i]t is axiomatic that, in a continuity test of a wire, one must monitor 
the connection point at the same time the test signal is applied."159 Judge Nies 
also pointed to parts of the specification that supported this narrower 
construction.160 Under the narrower construction, the claims were not 
antici pated.161 
The application of the BRI standard by the majority in Graves exemplifies 
the possibility that the use of the standard will deny patent protection for claims 
that, given their "normal" construction, are actually valid.162 The difference 
between the majority and the dissent's constructions is that the majority 
construes the claims more broadly, citing the BRI standard for support.163 If the 
majority had not applied the BRI standard, they may have agreed with the 
dissent; and the claims would have survived scrutiny. Applying the BRI 
standard forced the majority to judge the validity of an invention with a broader 
claim scope, which captured subject matter that was not novel.164 Referring back 
to Figure 1,165 the anticipating reference in Graves fell within the gray area 
captured by only the BRI standard. Put another way, the decision in Graves was 
a Type II error-just the type of irreversible, erroneous rejection of an invention 
that the BRI standard invites.166 Hence, the BRI standard has a direct link to the 
denial of patentability for claims that would be valid if scrutinized under the 
normal interpretation methodology employed in litigation. 
This reading of Graves is open to critique. The majority in Graves did 
conclude, in the alternative, that the claims would have been anticipated even 
under the narrower interpretation of the dissent.167 That is, the prior art actually 
fell within the white part of Figure 1 and, thus, would have anticipated the 
invention under both the BRI and the normal interpretation. If true, the BRI 
standard created harmless error. The dissent, however, contested the majority's 
1s9 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 1154, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1702 (Nies, J., dissenting). 
162 See supra Part III.D. 
163 See Graves, 69 F.3d at 1152, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701. 
164 See id. 
165 See supra Part III.D. 
166 See id. 
167 Graves, 69 F.3d at 1152, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701. 
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conclusion.16s Regardless of the situation in Graves, the fact that the BRl standard 
creates a harmless rejection of the pending claims in one case does not mean such 
BRl-prompted rejections are harmless in all cases. One also has to wonder if the 
majority made this alternative holding to take some of the sting out of the 
inequity of applying the BRl standard in this case. In other words, the BRl 
standard may force courts to articulate alternative justifications for their holdings 
because of the inequitable and unjustifiable harm the BRl standard imposes on 
applicants. 
One may also read Graves as a case in which both the majority and 
dissent apply the same BRl standard but arrive at different conclusions. This 
may be true, but the majority's interpretation is a broader BRl than the 
dissent's. 169 The majority also made a point of citing BRI case law to support its 
interpretation.170 Moreover, if Graves simply demonstrates an intra-circuit 
dispute as to the meaning of the BRl, then the inconsistent conclusions reached 
prove the final problem with the BRl standard-that it is hopelessly 
ambiguous.171 In re Buszard, described below, exemplifies this problem in more 
detail.172 
Graves, similar to Trans Texas, also exemplifies the BRI standard's 
unseemly ability to generate a different definition of an invention than normal 
claim interpretation.173 The majority in Graves, taking the BRl approach, reached 
a different definition of the claim limitation at issue than the dissent, who took a 
narrower view of the limitation's meaning.174 
The difference between the majority's interpretation and the dissent's 
interpretation also shows the BRI standard's disruption to horizontal equity and 
certainty in patent law, which are goals of the Federal Circuit.175 If this was an 
appeal from a district court decision, the absence of the BRl standard would 
168 Id. at 1153-54, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1702 (Nies, J., dissenting). 
169 See id. at 1152, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701. 
170 Id. 
171 See supra Part III.F. 
172 See 504 F.3d 1364, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2007); infra Part IV.C. 
173 See supra Part III.D. 
174 See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra Part III.B. 
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likely have put the majority and dissent on the same page as to claim meaning-
the dissent's. 
C. In re Buszard -Ambiguity in the BRI Standard 
The Federal Circuit's recent decision in In re Buszard provides another 
good example of the ambiguity in the BRI standard and the uncertainty its 
application generates.176 The factual situation in Buszard was very similar to that 
in Graves: the appropriateness of an anticipation rejection of pending claims 
hinged on whether the USPTO correctly interpreted the claims at issue.177 In 
Buszard, the majority and dissent were both more explicit about using the BRI 
standard, although the dissent claimed the majority did not correctly apply the 
standard in its review of the USPTO's interpretation.178 
The technology at issue in Buszard was a flame retardant composition 
that contained flexible polyurethane foam. 179 The claim term at issue was a 
"flexible polyurethane foam reaction mixture."18° The prior art disclosed a rigid 
polyurethane foam that, when crushed, loses its rigidity because it breaks up into 
small particles.181 The USPTO interpreted the claim term "flexible polyurethane 
foam" to include the earlier disclosed rigid foam because the claim term included 
"any reaction mixture which produces, at least ultimately, a flexible polyurethane 
foam."182 
The applicant argued that those skilled in the art know that "a flexible 
polyurethane foam reaction mixture is different from a rigi~ polyurethane foam 
reaction mixture" and thus the claim term was not anticipated.183 At oral 
argument before the Federal Circuit, the USPTO agreed that one skilled in the art 
knows that flexible polyurethane foams have a different chemical structure and 
produce different chemical reactants than rigid foams. 184 Regardless, the USPTO 
176 See 504 F.3d at 1364, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749. 
177 Id. at 1366, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750. 
178 Id. at 1369, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
179 Id. at 1365-66, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749-50. 
180 Id. at 1366, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (internal quotations omitted). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
184 Id. 
2009 Unreasonableness of Broadest Reasonable Interpretation Standard 317 
argued that the claims encompassed rigid foams when the BRI standard was 
properly applied.tss 
The majority agreed with the applicant's argument that the claims cannot 
encompass rigid foam because the claims and specification "specifically state the 
requirement of a flexible polyurethane foam reaction mixture."186 Trying to stay 
true to the BRI standard, the majority concluded that, although the USPTO's 
interpretation was broad, it was not "reasonable," and thus they reversed the 
USPTO's rejection.t87 
The dissent, however, asserted that the majority failed to properly apply 
the BRI standard.188 Under the dissent's application of the BRI standard, in 
absence of an explicit definition of "flexible polyurethane foam" in the 
specification, the term must be given its broadest interpretation.189 The dissent 
concluded that the USPTO's interpretation met the standard-it was "broad," and 
it was also not unreasonable.190 This interpretation would have rendered the 
claims invalid.191 The dissent pointed out in its conclusion that if the applicant 
"seeks a specific claim interpretation, he should amend his claim so it conveys his 
intended meaning."192 
The disagreement between the majority and dissent in Buszard 
exemplifies the last problem with the BRI standard: the ambiguity of the 
standard and the uncertainty it produces. Both the majority and the dissent cited 
the same BRI standard; and they both looked at the claim language and the 
specification, yet they came up with different claim interpretations.193 Unlike in 




188 Id. at 1368, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
189 Id. (Prost, J., dissenting). 
190 Id. at 1369, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
191 Id. (Prost, J., dissenting). 
192 Id. at 1370-71, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1754 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
193 Compare id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751, with id. at 1370, 84 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
194 Id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
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nonetheless reached different results due to a difference of opinion as to whether 
the USPTO's interpretation was "reasonable."195 
The BRI standard creates this additional battleground in the 
interpretation process-even after the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence is 
evaluated, there can still be a dispute over the reasonableness of the resulting 
interpretation. The lack of any metric that defines what is reasonable in this 
situation causes the majority and dissent to point fingers, using such imprecise 
phrases as "not reasonable"196 or "not unreasonable."197 The BRI standard is not 
robust enough to contribute to the discussion; it only increases disagreement 
among judges, examiners, and other observers. 
One could read Buszard as a case simply about a failure of the majority to 
apply the BRI standard at all, as opposed to one about the uncertainty in 
applying the BRI standard. The dissent certainly made this claim, stating that the 
"majority's opinion pays lip service to this precedent," the BRI standard, "[but] 
does not apply it in this case."19s If so, then Buszard is like Graves, providing 
another example of how the BRI standard can improperly deny patent protection 
to a pending claim. The majority may have had to go out of its way to pay lip 
service to, but ultimately avoid, the BRI standard-in contradiction of case law-
to allow the claims. Put another way, the claims are patentable under normal 
claim interpretation methodology, but become invalid when broadened. 
Although the result was not disastrous in Buszard-the applicant got her patent 
just as she presumably would have under the narrower "normal" standard-the 
dissent contends that the USPTO should have denied the patent if it had 
correctly applied the BRI standard.199 Buszard is another example of how the BRI 
standard can lead to denial of patent protection on a claim that would be 
allowable in district court. Specifically, if one more judge had agreed with the 
dissent's conclusion to deny patent protection in this case, it would have created 
a Type II error.200 
19s Compare id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751, with id. at 1370, 84 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
196 Id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
197 Id. at 1369, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
19s Id. (Prost, J., dissenting). 
199 Id. at 1370, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
200 See supra text accompanying notes 95-105. 
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If the dissent is correct in that Buszard is a case about the majority failing 
to apply the BRI standard, then the case also demonstrates how the standard 
generates different meanings of the invention.201 The BRI standard changes the 
way an interpreter looks at intrinsic evidence such as the claim and the 
specification. It forces the examiner to give the claim language a broad meaning, 
even if, as the USPTO admitted in the case, the meaning is not the one given to 
the term by those skilled in the art.202 The claims then have a meaning that is 
different from the one a district court would give them. In the same vein, there is 
no equitable treatment of the claims between the USPTO and in district court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The BRI standard has probably lasted this long because its propriety has 
not been closely questioned. Scrutiny leads to the conclusion that there is simply 
no justification for the "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard. In fact, the 
standard has the potential to do significant harm. The BRI standard is a judicial 
construction created by the CCP A and currently used by the Federal Circuit. The 
Federal Circuit should stop using the standard and officially adopt a unitary 
approach to claim interpretation, regardless of forum. Appeals from cases such 
as the recent Board opinion in Miyazaki provide a great vehicle for making such a 
change. 
201 See supra Part II.A. 
202 Buszard, 503 F.3d at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 

